Building a Better Iraq

Although this New York Review of Books piece was up to date when it was published, fast-moving events surrounding the Iraqi constitution have made it a nice backgrounder on the situation. Peter W. Galbraith, former U.S. Ambassador to Croatia and current senior diplomatic fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, explains the reality of Iraq that we simply don't want to face: It's made up of three ethnic and culturally distinct peoples that don't want to live together. The Shiites have the majority, the Kurds have a strong minority (and a taste of autonomy while under the protection of the U.S. and Great Britain during the last years of Saddam Hussein's regime), and the Sunni Arabs--used to holding power under Saddam--have few current resources to maintain their position. Little of what Galbraith says is new, but much of it is barely familiar. He explains how the "Iraqi military" is actually no such thing:

Today, the Iraqi military and security services are a mixture of Kurdish peshmerga, rehabilitated Sunni Arab officers from Saddam's army, and Shiite and Sunni Arab recruits. What is little known is that virtually all of the effective fighting units in the new Iraqi military are in fact former Kurdish peshmerga. These units owe no loyalty to Iraq, and, if recalled by the Kurdistan government, they will all go north to fight for Kurdistan.

The Shiites, naturally, want a Shiite military that will be loyal to the new Shiite-dominated government. They have encouraged the Shiite militias— and notably the Badr Brigade—to take over security in the Shiite south, and to integrate themselves into the national military. Neither the Shiites nor the Kurds want the Sunni Arabs to have a significant part in the new Iraqi military or security services. They suspect— with good reason in many cases—that the Sunni Arabs in the military are in fact cooperating with the insurgency. No Kurdish minister in the national government uses Iraqi forces for his personal security, nor will any of them inform the Iraqi authorities of their movements. Instead, they entrust their lives to specially trained peshmerga brought to Baghdad. Many Shiite ministers use the Shiite militias in the same way.

The Shiites have strong ties to Iran, and they've been making good use of them.

Through its spies, infiltrators, and sympathizers, Iran has a presence in Iraq's security forces and military. It is virtually certain that Iran has access to any intelligence that the Iraqis have. Not only does Iran have an opportunity to insert its people into the Iraqi apparatus, it also has many Iraqi allies willing to do its bidding. When I asked an Iraqi with major intelligence responsibilities about foreign infiltration into Iraq, he dismissed the influx from Syria (the focus of the Bush administration's attention) and said the real problem was from Iran. When I asked how the infiltration took place, he said simply, "But Iran is already in Baghdad."

On July 7, the Iranian and Iraqi defense ministers signed an agreement on military cooperation that would have Iranians train the Iraqi military. The Iraqi defense minister made a point of saying American views would not count: "Nobody can dictate to Iraq its relations with other countries."

For whatever reason (and I can think of a few possibilities), the Bush Administration has shown little concern over Iranian influence into Iraq. As we have more time to digest the draft constitution, we'll have a chance to see how that influence may be playing out. In the meantime, Galbraith has a couple of suggestions:

There are two central problems in today's Iraq: the first is the insurgency and the second is an Iranian takeover. The insurgency, for all its violence, is a finite problem. The insurgents may not be defeated but they cannot win. This, of course, raises a question about what a prolonged US military presence in Iraq can accomplish, since there is no military solution to the problem of Sunni Arab rejection of Shiite rule, which is now integral to the insurgency.

Iraq's Shiites endured decades of brutal repression, to which the United States was mostly indifferent. Iran, by contrast, was a good friend and committed supporter of the Shiites. By bringing freedom to Iraq, the Bush administration has allowed Iraq's Shiites to vote for pro-Iranian religious parties that seek to create—and are creating —an Islamic state. This is not ideal but it is the result of a democratic process.

The Bush administration should, however, draw the line at allowing a Shiite theocracy to establish control over all of Iraq. This requires a drastic change of strategy. Building powerful national institutions in Iraq serves the interest of one group—today it is the Shiites—at the expense of the others, and inevitably produces conflict and instability. Instead, the administration should concentrate on political arrangements that match the reality in Iraq. This means a loose confederation in which each of Iraq's communities governs itself, and is capable of defending itself.

I've been quoting too much. Go read the full piece for yourself.

And while you're following Iraqi draft constitution links, check out Juan Cole's initial assessment of the circumstances surrounding the presentation of the draft constitution and of the draft itself. The Iraqi writers of the draft constitution have often been compared to the Founding Fathers. Matthew Yglesias runs with this analogy but adds analogues for slaves and indigenous peoples. But don't worry, he's predicting the emergence of a fully formed liberal democracy around 2170.